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Fairness in Communication for Omniscience
Ni Ding∗, Chung Chan‡, Qiaoqiao Zhou‡, Rodney A. Kennedy∗ and Parastoo Sadeghi∗
Abstract—We consider the problem of how to fairly distribute
the minimum sum-rate among the users in communication for
omniscience (CO). We formulate a problem of minimizing a
weighted quadratic function over a submodular base polyhedron
which contains all achievable rate vectors, or transmission
strategies, for CO that have the same sum-rate. By solving
it, we can determine the rate vector that optimizes the Jain’s
fairness measure, a more commonly used fairness index than
the Shapley value in communications engineering. We show
that the optimizer is a lexicographically optimal (lex-optimal)
base and can be determined by a decomposition algorithm
(DA) that is based on submodular function minimization (SFM)
algorithm and completes in strongly polynomial time. We prove
that the lex-optimal minimum sum-rate strategy for CO can be
determined by finding the lex-optimal base in each user subset
in the fundamental partition and the complexity can be reduced
accordingly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication for omniscience (CO) is a problem pro-
posed in [1]. It is assumed that there is a group of users
in the system and each of them observes a component of a
discrete memoryless multiple source in private. The users can
exchange their information in order to attain omniscience, the
state that each user obtains the total information in the entire
multiple source in the system. A typical example is the coded
cooperative data exchange (CCDE) problem [2] where a group
of geographically close users communicate with each other via
error-free broadcast channels in order to recover a packet set.
The fundamental problem in CO and CCDE is how to
achieve omniscience with minimum total transmission rate,
or minimum sum-rate. The studies in [3], [4] show that the
minimum sum-rate can be obtained by solving an optimization
problem over the partitions of user set, while the authors in
[5], [6] propose polynomial time algorithms that determine the
minimum sum-rate and a corresponding strategy based on sub-
modular function minimization (SFM) techniques. However,
the minimum sum-rate strategy is not unique in general, and
the algorithms in [5], [6] utilizing Edmond’s greedy algorithm
[7] necessarily return an extremal point, or an unfair minimum
sum-rate strategy.
On the other hand, fairness is an important factor in CO.
For example, in CCDE, the users are considered as peers in
wireless communications. A fair transmission strategy encour-
ages them to take part in CO and helps prevent driving the
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battery usage of some users. Fairness has been considered in
[8]–[10] for CCDE and in [11] for CO. However, the methods
proposed in [8], [9] can only determine an integer valued
fairest minimum sum-rate strategy in terms of Jain’s fairness
index [12], which may not be applied to general CO systems
where the transmission rates could be fractional; the method
in [10] gives a fractional optimizer but relies on building a
multi-layer hypergraph model which can be quite complex
for large scale systems; the Shapley value proposed in [11]
incurs exponential complexity and does not coincide with the
Jain’s fairest solution, the commonly used fairness measure in
communications engineering. We will give example to show
the difference between Jain’s fairest solution and Shapley
value in this paper.
The main purpose of this paper is to determine the fairest
solution in the minimum sum-rate strategy set for CO. We
consider the problem of minimizing a weighted quadratic
function on a constraint set. The constraint set contains all
achievable transmission strategies that have the same sum-
rate which is greater than or equal to the minimal one for
CO. This problem is equivalent to determining the Jain’s
fairest transmission strategy when all users are assigned the
same weight. We show that the constraint set of this problem
is a submodular base polyhedron and the minimizer is the
lexicographically optimal (lex-optimal) base. The problem can
be reduced to an SFM problem, and the lex-optimal base
can be determined by a decomposition algorithm (DA) in
O(|V |2 · SFM(|V |)) time, where |V | is the cardinality of the
user set and SFM is the complexity of minimizing a submod-
ular function which is strongly polynomial. We also show that
the lex-optimal minimum sum-rate strategy can be determined
by obtaining the lex-optimal base for each user subset in the
fundamental partition [3], the optimal partition corresponding
to the minimum sum-rate. The task of determining the lex-
optimal base in a user subset is less complex than in the
ground/entire user set and can be completed in parallel in
distributed systems.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let V = {1, 2, . . .} be a finite set. We assume that there
are |V | > 1 users in the system. Let ZV = (Zi : i ∈ V )
be a vector of discrete random variables indexed by V . For
each i ∈ V , user i can privately observe an n-sequence Zni of
the random source Zi that is i.i.d. generated according to the
joint distribution PZV . We allow users exchange their sources
directly so as to let all of them recover the source sequence
Z
n
V . Let rV = (ri : i ∈ V ) be a rate vector indexed by V .
We call rV an achievable rate vector, or transmission strategy,
if omniscience is possible by letting users communicate with
the rates designated by rV . Let r be the function associated
2with rV such that r(X) =
∑
i∈X ri, ∀X ⊆ V . For X,Y ⊆ V ,
let H(ZX) be the amount of randomness in ZX measured by
Shannon entropy and H(ZX |ZY ) be the conditional entropy
of ZX given ZY . It is shown in [1] that an achievable rate
vector must satisfy the Slepian-Wolf constraints: r(X) ≥
H(ZX |ZV \X), ∀X ⊂ V . Let α ∈ R+ and
fα(X) =
{
H(ZX |ZV \X) X ⊂ V
α X = V
.
The polyhedron and base polyhedron of fα are respectively
P (fα,≥) = {rV | r(X) ≥ fα(X), ∀X ⊆ V },
B(fα,≥) = {rV | rV ∈ P (fα,≥), r(V ) = α},
where B(fα,≥) contains all achievable rate vectors that have
sum-rate equal α. B(fα,≥) = ∅ means that there is no
achievable rate vector that has sum-rate α. Let f#α (X) =
fα(V ) − fα(V \ X), ∀X ⊆ V be the dual set function of
fα. We have B(f#α ,≤) = B(fα,≥) [13].1 Denote Π(V ) the
set of all partitions of V . It is shown in [3], [4], [11] that f#α
is intersecting submodular and B(fα,≥) 6= ∅ if α is no less
than the minimum sum-rate
α∗(V ) = max
P∈Π(V ) : |P|>1
∑
C∈P
H(ZV \C |ZC)
|P| − 1
. (1)
We call the maximizer of (1) the fundamental partition and
denote by P∗. If α ≥ α∗(V ), B(fˆ#α ,≤) = B(f#α ,≤) where
fˆ#α (X) = min
P∈Π(X)
∑
C∈P
f#α (C), ∀X ⊆ V
is the Dilworth truncation of f#α and fˆ#α is submodular.
Usually, B(fα,≥) is not a singleton when it is nonempty.
So, a natural question that follows is to find a rate vector in
B(fα,≥) that distributes the transmission load as evenly as
possible among the users.
Example II.1. Consider the user set V = {1, 2, 3} and let
Wi be an independent uniformly distributed random bit. The
three users observe respectively
Z1 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wd,We),
Z2 = (Wa,Wb,Wf ),
Z3 = (Wc,Wd,Wf ).
In this system, it can be shown that α∗(V ) = 3.5 and B(f#α ,≤
) = B(fα,≥) = ∅ if α < 3.5. For α = 3.5, B(f#3.5,≤) =
B(f3.5,≥) = {(2.5, 0.5, 0.5)} is singleton. However, for α =
4, we have f#4 as
f
#
4 (∅) = 0, f
#
4 ({1}) = 3, f
#
4 ({2}) = 1, f
#
4 ({3}) = 1,
f
#
4 ({1, 2}) = 4, f
#
4 ({1, 3}) = 4, f
#
4 ({2, 3}) = 3,
f
#
4 ({1, 2, 3}) = 4,
and its Dilworth truncation as
fˆ
#
4 (∅) = 0, fˆ
#
4 ({1}) = 3, fˆ
#
4 ({2}) = 1, fˆ
#
4 ({3}) = 1,
fˆ
#
4 ({1, 2}) = 4, fˆ
#
4 ({1, 3}) = 4, fˆ
#
4 ({2, 3}) = 2,
fˆ
#
4 ({1, 2, 3}) = 4.
1The majority studies on CO are based on the (intersecting) submodularity
of the dual set function f#α and its base polyhedron B(f#α ,≤), e.g., [3]–[6].
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Fig. 1: In the CO system in Example II.1, the Shapley value
rˆV = (
8
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ) is the gravity center of B(fˆ
#
4 ,≤). The Jain’s
fairest rate vector is r∗V = (2, 1, 1) 6= rˆV . Instead, r∗V =
(2, 1, 1) = argmax{r(V ) | rV ∈ P (fˆ
#
4 ,≤), rV ≤ (2, 2, 2)}.
It can be shown that B(fˆ#4 ,≤) = B(f
#
4 ,≤) = B(f4,≥) is a
convex region, as shown in Fig. 1, instead of a singleton.
In this paper, we assume that α ≥ α∗(V ). We will show
that this assumption holds for all elements in the fundamental
partition P∗ in Section IV-B. Since B(fˆ#α ,≤) = B(f#α ,≤) =
B(fα,≥) when α ≥ α∗(V ), we mainly present the results in
terms of fˆ#α . In Section VI, we will show how to solve the
fairness problem by the oracle calls of f#α .2
III. MOTIVATION: JAIN’S FAIRNESS VS. SHAPLEY VALUE
It is shown in [11] that a fair rate vector in B(fˆ#α ,≤) can
be determined by the Shapley value rˆV [14]. Each tuple rˆi of
rˆV quantifies the average marginal contribution of user i in
CO, and rˆV is the gravity center of B(fˆ#α ,≤) [14]. But, the
Jain’s fairest3 rate vector in B(fˆ#α ,≤) is the minimizer of
min{
∑
i∈V
r2i | rV ∈ B(fˆ
#
α ,≤)} (2)
that does not usually coincide with the Shapley value.
Example III.1. In the system in Example II.1, in B(fˆ#4 ,≤),
the Shapley value is rˆV = (83 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ), while the Jain’s fairest
rate vector is (2, 1, 1). See Fig. 1.
It can be easily seen based on the definition of Shapley
value in [14] that rˆV is usually biased so that the user has more
information on ZV transmits more. For example, in the system
in Example II.1, we have H(Z1) greater than H(Z2) and
H(Z3). The three vertex points of B(fˆ#4 ,≤), (2, 1, 1), (3, 0, 1)
and (3, 1, 0), all have r1 greater than the other entries, and so
does the gravity center rˆV . However, in communications or
network engineering, we want to distribute the rates as evenly
as possible without considering the users’ prior knowledge
about the sources. So, the ideal rate vector is in the form of
λ · χV , where χX is the characteristic or incidence vector of
X ⊆ V . If such a rate vector does not belong to B(fˆ#α ,≤), we
2The oracle takes X ⊆ V as an input and outputs f#α (X).
3Jain’s fairness index of rV is
(
∑
i∈V ri)
2
|V |
∑
i∈V r
2
i
ranges from 1
|V |
(unfairest)
to 1 (fairest) [12].
3need to at least find one that is as close as possible to it, e.g.
the rate vector (2, 1, 1) in Fig. 1. In this sense, the minimizer
of (2) provides a better solution than Shapley value, and it is
worth discussing on how to solve problem (2) efficiently.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Let wV be a positive weight vector. We consider a problem
that is more general than (2):
min{
∑
i∈V
r2i
wi
| rV ∈ B(fˆ
#
α ,≤)}. (3)
The objective function can be considered as a weighted Jain’s
fairness measure in that (3) reduces to (2) when wV =
χV = (1, . . . , 1). The main purpose of this section is to
show that the fairest minimum sum-rate strategy for CO can
be determined based on the fundamental partition P∗. We
start this section by presenting some existing results on the
minimization problem (3) in Section IV-A, where we show
that the minimizer of (3) is a lexicographically optimal (lex-
optimal) base in B(fˆ#α ,≤). Based on these results, we present
our main result in Section IV-B: The lex-optimal minimum
sum-rate strategy is a direct merge of the the lex-optimal bases
of the user subsets in the fundamental partition P∗.
A. Lex-optimal Base
A set X is called rV -tight if r(X) = fˆ#α (X).4 Let
dep(rV , i) be the smallest rV -tight set that includes i. For
rV ∈ B(fˆ#α ,≤), dep(rV , i) can be expressed as [13]
dep(rV , i) = {j | ∃ξ > 0: rV + ξ(χi − χj) ∈ B(fˆ#α ,≤)},
where ξ(χi − χj) is called elementary transformation. It
is shown in [13] that the local optimality with respect to
the direction χi − χj implies the global optimality: r∗V is
the minimizer of (3) if ∑i∈V (r∗i )2wi ≤ ∑i∈V r2iwi , ∀rV =
r
∗
V + ξ(χi − χj) ∈ B(fˆ
#
α ,≤). The condition is equivalent
to (4) in the lemma below.
Lemma IV.1 ( [13, Theorem 8.1]). r∗V is the minimizer of (3)
iff
r∗i
wi
≥
r∗j
wj
, ∀j ∈ dep(r∗V , i) \ {i}. (4)
Let TwV (rV ) = (
rσ(1)
wσ(1)
, . . . ,
rσ(|V |)
wσ(|V |)
) where σ(i) is an
ordering of user indices such that rσ(1)
wσ(1)
≤ . . . ≤
rσ(|V |)
wσ(|V |)
, e.g.,
T(4,2,1)((2, 3, 1)) = (0.5, 1, 1.5) where σ(1) = 1, σ(2) = 3
and σ(3) = 2. It is shown in [15] that, for r∗V and any other
rV ∈ B(fˆ#α ,≤), we have
r∗σ(i)
wσ(i)
=
rσ(i)
wσ(i)
, ∀i > i′ and
r∗
σ(i′)
wσ(i′)
>
rσ(i′)
wσ(i′)
for some i′. It is called TwV (r∗V ) lexicographically
dominates TwV (rV ) and denoted by TwV (r∗V ) ≥lex TwV (rV ).
So, r∗V is called the lex-optimal base in B(fˆ#α ,≤) w.r.t. wV .
Example IV.2. In the system in Example II.1, for wV =
(4, 2, 1), we have lex-optimal base r∗V = (2.4, 1, 0.6), for
4An rV -tight set X means rate saturation in entries ri for all i ∈ X , i.e.,
due to the constraint r(X) ≤ fˆ#α (X), for ξ > 0, rV + ξ · χi /∈ P (fˆ#α ,≤
), ∀i ∈ X . The example in Section V shows how tight set is related to the
minimizer r∗
V
of (3).
which dep(r∗V , 1) = {1, 2, 3}, dep(r∗V , 2) = {2}, dep(r∗V , 3) =
{1, 2, 3} and Lemma IV.1 holds. For example, for i = 1, j = 2,
we have j ∈ dep(r∗V , i) \ {i},
r∗i
wi
= 0.6 ≥
r∗j
wj
= 0.5. Also,
TwV (r
∗
V ) = (0.5, 0.6, 0.6) ≥lex TwV (rV ) for any other rV ∈
B(fˆ#4 ,≤). For example, for rV = (2.2, 1, 0.8) ∈ B(fˆ#4 ,≤),
we have TwV (rV ) = (0.5, 0.55, 0.8) and TwV (r∗V ) ≥lex
TwV (rV ) because the 1st entries of TwV (rV ) and TwV (r∗V )
are equal while the 2nd entry of TwV (r∗V ) is greater than
that of TwV (rV ). If we change wV to (1, 1, 1), we have
r
∗
V = (2, 1, 1). It also can be shown that Lemma IV.1 holds
and (2, 1, 1) is the lex-optimal base in B(fˆ#4 ,≤).
B. Lex-optimal minimum sum-rate strategy
Let the fundamental partition be P∗ = {C1, . . . , C|P∗|}
where ∅ 6= Cm ⊂ V, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , |P∗|}. We have [3]
α∗(V ) =
∑
Cm∈P∗
f
#
α∗(V )(Cm) =
∑
Cm∈P∗
fˆ
#
α∗(V )(Cm).
Also, for each Cm ∈ P∗, we have [8]
f
#
α∗(V )(Cm) = fˆ
#
α∗(V )(Cm) ≥ α
∗(Cm).
Alternatively speaking, in order to achieve omniscience with
the minimum sum-rate α∗(V ), each user subset Cm in the
fundamental partition P∗ must transmit exactly fˆ#
α∗(V )(Cm)
times which is greater than or equal to the minimum sum-rate
for achieving the omniscience in Cm itself. Let hCm(X) =
fˆ
#
α∗(V )(X), ∀X ⊆ Cm. For Cm, Cm′ ∈ P
∗ such that
Cm 6= Cm′ , denote rCm ⊕ rCm′ = (ri : i ∈ Cm ⊔ Cm′)
the direct merging of rCm and rCm′ . For example, for
rCm = (r1, r4, r5) = (2, 3, 4) and rCm′ = (r2, r3) = (4, 1),
rCm ⊕ rCm′ = (r1, . . . , r5) = (2, 4, 1, 3, 4). The following
theorem states that the lex-optimal minimum sum-rate strategy
w.r.t. wV is a direct merge of the lex-optimal base in each user
subset Cm w.r.t. wCm in the fundamental partition P∗.
Theorem IV.3. The lex-optimal base in B(fˆ#
α∗(V )) w.r.t. wV
is r∗V = r∗C1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ r
∗
C|P∗|
, where P∗ is the fundamental
partition and r∗Cm is the lex-optimal base in B(hCm ,≤) w.r.t.
wCm .
Proof: For any rV ∈ B(fˆ#α∗(V ),≤), r(Cm) =
fˆ
#
α∗(V )(Cm) = hCm(Cm), ∀Cm ∈ P
∗
, i.e., Cm is rV -tight
for all user subset Cm in the fundamental partition P∗. Let
r
′
V = r
∗
C1
⊕ . . .⊕r∗C|P∗| where r
∗
Cm
is the lex-optimal base of
B(hCm ,≤) w.r.t. wCm . Then, r′V ∈ B(fˆ
#
α∗(V ),≤) necessarily
[13, Lemma 3.1]. Also, for all i ∈ Cm ∈ P∗, dep(r′V , i) ⊆ Cm
and r
′
i
wi
≥
r′j
wj
, ∀j ∈ dep(r∗V , i) \ {i}, which is equivalent to
condition (4) in Lemma IV.1. Therefore, r′V is the lex-optimal
base w.r.t. wV .
Example IV.4. Let the user set be V = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The four
users observe respectively
Z1 = (Wc,Wd,Wf ,Wg,Wh),
Z2 = (Wa,Wd,Wg,Wh),
Z3 = (Wc,Wd,We,Wf ,Wg,Wh),
Z4 = (Wa,Wb,Wf ).
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Fig. 2: The path towards the lex-optimal r∗V w.r.t. wV in the system in Example II.1.
In this system, we have minimum sum-rate for CO α∗(V ) = 6
and the fundamental partition P∗ = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}}. For
C1 = {1, 2, 3}, we have hC1(X) = fˆ
#
6 (X), ∀X ⊆ C1 and
B(hC1 ,≤) 6= ∅ because hC1(C1) = 5 > α∗(C1) = 4.
Consider determining the lex-optimal base in B(fˆ#6 ,≤) w.r.t.
wV = χV = (1, 1, 1, 1) by Theorem IV.3. The lex-optimal base
w.r.t. wC1 = (1, 1, 1) in B(hC1 ,≤) is r∗C1 = (r
∗
1 , r
∗
2 , r
∗
3) =
(53 ,
5
3 ,
5
3 ). For C2 = {4}, r
∗
C2
= r∗4 = 1. The direct merging of
rC1 and rC2 is r∗C1 ⊕ r
∗
C2
= (53 ,
5
3 ,
5
3 , 1). It can be shown that
r
∗
C1
⊕ r∗C2 is the lex-optimal base w.r.t. wV = (1, 1, 1, 1) in
B(fˆ#6 ,≤), which is also the Jain’s fairest minimum sum-rate
strategy.
V. PATH TOWARDS r∗V
The problem unsolved in Theorem IV.3 is how to determine
the lex-optimal base in each user subset. In this section, we use
the existing results in [15] to show that there exists a piecewise
linear path towards the lex-optimal base, which can be found
by a decomposition algorithm in the existing literature.
Let the distinct values of r
∗
i
wi
of the lex-optimal base r∗V
be λ1, . . . , λN such that 0 = λ0 < λ1 < . . . < λN . Denote
S0 = ∅ and Sn = {i | r
∗
i
wi
≤ λn, i ∈ V }. We have all Sn form
a chain [15]
CS : ∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ SN = V
such that r∗i = λnwi, for all i ∈ Sn\Sn−1. Since dep(r∗V , i) ⊆
Sn, ∀i ∈ Sn, r∗(Sn) = fˆ#α (Sn). It means that we cannot
increase the value of r∗i for all i ∈ Sn because otherwise the
condition r∗(Sn) ≤ fˆ#α (Sn) in the polyhedron P (fˆ#α ,≤) is
breached. Alternatively speaking, r∗V ∧λn is the maximizer of
max{r(V ) | rV ∈ P (fˆ#α ,≤), rV ≤ λn ·wV } [15], where r∗V ∧
λn · wV = (min{r∗i , λn · wi} : i ∈ V ) is the componentwise
minimization of r∗V and λn ·wV . It is clear that a piecewise
linear path in P (fˆ#α ,≤) towards the lex-optimal base r∗V can
be determined by considering the problem
max{r(V ) | rV ∈ P (fˆ
#
α ,≤), rV ≤ λ ·wV }, (5)
where λ ∈ [0,+∞). This path also determines the values of
all Sn and λn.
Example V.1. We explain the path (0, 0, 0) → (0, 1, 1) →
(2, 1, 1) towards the lex-optimal base r∗V = (2, 1, 1) w.r.t.
wV = (1, 1, 1) in Fig. 2(a) by using (5) as follows. We initiate
r
∗
V = (0, 0, 0) and the direction λ ·wV = λ · χV = (λ, λ, λ).
We increase λ from 0 to move along the direction χV until
at λ = 1 we reach a boundary of P (fˆ#4 ,≤) that corre-
sponds to the inequality r({2, 3}) ≤ fˆ#4 ({2, 3}) = 2. Here,
the boundary point (1, 1, 1) is necessarily the maximizer of
max{r(V ) | rV ∈ P (fˆ
#
4 ,≤), rV ≤ λ1 ·wV = (1, 1, 1)}. We
cannot increase λ any more along the direction λ · χV since
otherwise we will be out of P (fˆ#4 ,≤) so that the resulting
vector does not belong to B(fˆ#4 ,≤). For the set {2, 3} that
is associated with the boundary, we know that we can at
least allocate fˆ#4 ({2, 3}) = 2 rates evenly to users 2 and
3. Therefore, by letting λ1 = 1 and S1 = {2, 3}, we assign
rates r∗2 = λ1w2 = 1 and r∗3 = λ1w3 = 1 so that the rate r∗V
is updated to (0, 1, 1). By knowing that we cannot increase
any further along any dimension in S1,5 we set the direction
λ · χV \S1 = (λ, 0, 0) and continue to increase the value of λ
from r∗V = (0, 1, 1). The purpose is to see if we can distribute
the remaining rates fˆ#4 (V ) − fˆ
#
4 (S1) = 2 evenly among the
users in V \S1. At λ = 2, we reach the second boundary that
is set by the constraint r({1, 2, 3}) ≤ fˆ#4 ({1, 2, 3}) = 4 in
P (fˆ#4 ,≤). We set λ2 = 2 and S2 = {1, 2, 3}. For S2 \ S1 =
{3}, we assign r∗3 = λ2w3 = 2. r∗V is updated to (2, 1, 1).
Here, the second boundary point (2, 1, 1) is the maximizer of
max{r(V ) | rV ∈ P (fˆ
#
4 ,≤), rV ≤ λ2 · wV = (2, 2, 2)}.
Now, we have V \ S2 = ∅, which means all fˆ#4 (V ) = 4
rates have been allocated. We get r∗V = (2, 1, 1) as the lex-
optimal rate vector w.r.t. w = (1, 1, 1). In the same way, we
can show the path (0, 0, 0)→ (0, 1, 0)→ (2.4, 1, 0.6) towards
r
∗
V = (2.4, 1, 0.6) w.r.t. wV = (4, 2, 1) in Fig. 2(b). Based on
this path, we have λ1 = 0.5 corresponds to S1 = {2} and
λ2 = 0.6 corresponds to S2 = {1, 2, 3}.
Due to the min-max theorem [7]
max{r(V ) | rV ∈ P (fˆ
#
α ,≤), rV ≤ λ ·wV } =
min{fˆ#α (X) + λw(V \X) | X ⊆ V }, (6)
5It means that S1 is r∗V -tight, i.e., r
∗(S1) = fˆ
#
4 (S1).
5Algorithm 1: decomposition algorithm (DA) [16]
input : S, S in CS
output: the set that contains S, S and all Sn in CS such that
S ⊂ Sn ⊂ S
1 begin
2 λ =
fˆ#α (S)−fˆ
#
α (S)
w(S\S)
;
3 get S as the maximal minimizer of
min{fˆ#α (X)− λw(X) : X ⊆ V };
if S = S then return (S, S) else return
DA(S, S) ∪ DA(S, S)
4 end
problem (5) reduces to min{fˆ#α (X) − λw(X) | X ⊆ V },
which is an SFM problem and can be efficiently solved by
the DA algorithm in Algorithm 1 that is proposed in [16].
Example V.2. In B(fˆ#4 ,≤) in Example II.1, consider the
problem of finding the lex-optimal base r∗V w.r.t. wV =
(4, 2, 1) by the DA algorithm. We call DA(∅, V ), i.e., S = ∅
and S = V . We get λ = 47 and S = {2}. Since S 6=
S = V , DA(∅, {2}) is called where we get λ = 0.5 and
S = {2} = S. It returns {∅, {2}}. On the other hand, in the
call of DA({2}, V ), we get λ = 0.6 and S = V = S. It returns
{{2}, V }. We then get the chain CS : ∅ ⊂ {2} ⊂ {1, 2, 3} = V
corresponding to λ0 = 0, λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.6. By
calling DA algorithm to determine the lex-optimal base r∗V
w.r.t. wV = (1, 1, 1), we get the chain CS : ∅ ⊂ {2, 3} ⊂
{1, 2, 3} = V corresponding to λ0 = 0, λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 2.
The results are consistent with those in Example V.1.
VI. COMPLEXITY
In step 2 in Algorithm 1, the value of the Dilworth trun-
cation fˆ#α at certain X ⊆ V can be obtained by oracle
calls of f#α in O(|V | · SFM(|V |)) time, where SFM is the
complexity of minimizing a submodular function. In step 3,
the maximal minimizer of min{fˆ#α (X) − λw(X) | X ⊆ V }
can be obtained by considering the problem of min{f#α (X)−
λw(X) | X ⊆ V : i ∈ V }. For each i ∈ V , it completes in
O(|V |·SFM(|V |)) time by oracle calls of f#α . To determine all
Sn in chain CS , the DA algorithm is called for no greater than
2|V |− 1 times [17]. Therefore, the complexity of determining
r
∗
V by oracle calls of f#α is O(|V |2 · SFM(|V |)), which is
strongly polynomial as compared to the exponentially growing
complexity in obtaining the Shapley value rˆV [14].
Consider the complexity of determining the lex-optimal
minimum sum-rate strategy by Theorem IV.3. The fundamen-
tal partition P∗ can be determined in O(|V |2 · SFM(|V |))
time [18]. After obtaining P∗, we can determine the lex-
optimal base r∗Cm for each Cm ∈ P
∗ and get the lex-
optimal minimum sum-rate strategy r∗V . Since |Cm| < |V |,
O(|Cm|2 · SFM(|Cm|)), the complexity of finding r∗Cm , is
much lower than that of finding r∗V . In addition, r∗Cm for all
Cm ∈ P∗ can be found in parallel in distributed systems. For
example, in Example IV.4 where P∗ = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}}, we
can allow a user delegate in C1 = {1, 2, 3}, say, user 1, and
user 4 in C2 = {4} to determine the lex-optimal base r∗C1 and
r
∗
C2
, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of minimizing a weighted
quadratic function over the set of all achievable rate vectors
with the same sum-rate for CO. The objective function was
a generalization of the Jain’s fairness index. We showed that
if the constraint set was nonempty the optimizer was a lex-
optimal base that could be searched by a DA algorithm in
strongly polynomial time. We also showed that the lex-optimal
minimum sum-rate strategy for CO could be determined by
directly merging the lex-optimal bases for all user subset in
the fundamental partition, which could be completed in a
decentralized manner with lower complexity.
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